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Abstract: 
Examining tensions between the past and present uses of scientific concepts can help clarify their 
contributions as tools in experimental practices. This point can be illustrated by considering the 
concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations: despite debates over their respective referential 
reliabilities remaining unresolved within their interdependent histories, both are used as 
independently stable concepts in neuroimaging experiments. Building on an account of how these 
concepts function as tools structured for pursuit of diverging goals in experiments, this paper 
explores this tension by re-examining the continued reliance of each concept on inverse 
characterisations inherited from the nominally-discarded ‘mediator-view’ of sensory-like mental 
phenomena (SLMP). In doing so, I seek to demonstrate how examining unresolved tensions can 
help highlight that entrenched associations can remain both integral to, and obscured by, the uses 
of concepts as goal-directed tools within experimental practices. 
 
Keywords: Conceptual tools; Epistemic goals; Inferential associations; Neuroimaging practices; 
Mental imagery; Hallucinations.   
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Introduction  
The concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations are each used, independently of the other, to 
individuate discrete forms of sensory-like mental phenomena (SLMP) for further investigation. 
These uses sit in tension with the unresolved debates over the reliability of distinguishing discrete 
forms of SLMP. While identified in earlier research (Smith 2018a), this tension has not been fully 
examined. To explore this tension further, I revisit one of the connections between the histories of 
these two concepts. This connection is the ‘mediator-view’ of SLMP – an expectation that SLMP 
function as a midpoint between perception and abstract thought (Smith 2018b). In re-examining 
the ongoing relevance of the mediator-view of SLMP, I seek to demonstrate that this tension 
reveals how entrenched associations can be both integral to, and obscured by, the structured uses 
of these two concepts as goal-directed tools in experiments.1 
Mental imagery and hallucinations are both concepts that have received considerable 
attention, especially within histories of conceptual developments as relevant to specific disciplinary 
and social contexts.2 While occasionally contrasted with each other, the primary concept of interest 
tends to be either mental imagery or hallucinations. Taking a more symmetrical approach, I built on 
these studies to compare how mental imagery and hallucinations are each used as a scientific 
concept in neuroimaging experiments (Smith 2018a; 2018b; 2019).  Within this context, I used SLMP 
as an analytic category for any wakeful and endogenous mental phenomena experienced ‘as if’ 
perceived in one or more sensory-modality. For instance, visual SLMP are experienced ‘as if’ seen, 
auditory SLMP are experienced ‘as if’ heard, and so on for any sensations occurring in the absence 
of relevant perceptual stimuli. 
At this point, familiarity with the ordinariness of mental imagery and the distress associated 
with hallucinations may suggest that these are distinct experiences of ordinary and pathological 
SLMP; I don’t dispute that. Instead, my aim is to explore how mental imagery and hallucinations are 
                                                      
1This narrow focus is intended as a partial contribution to a specific field of research (on concept-use within 
experimental practices). I value methodological pluralism within historical and philosophical and sociological 
approaches to studying scientific practices – also see, Camilleri (2015), Chang (2014), Janet Vertesi (2015). My approach 
could be complemented by additional perspectives – from specialised historical and sociological studies that could 
enrich or challenge my descriptive account, to detailed philosophical and metaresearch interrogations of the various 
normative implications of this account. 
2 Many of these will be mentioned later. For a review of experimental approaches to investigating mental imagery more 
broadly, see Ganis and Schendan (2013). For an overview of neuroscientific investigations of hallucinations more 
broadly, see Jardri et al., (2013). As an example of exceptions to the trend, where concepts of mental imagery and 
hallucinations are used alongside each other, see Pearson and Westbrook (2015). 
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each used as scientific concepts in experimental practices. This exploration will therefore draw 
upon, and extend, my earlier argument that interrogating entrenched associations can contribute 
to understanding the structured uses of concepts as goal-directed tools within experimental 
research practices (Smith 2018a; 2018b). As such, while describing the uses of two neuroscientific 
concepts, the foundations of my approach are drawn from historical and philosophical studies of a 
wide range of scientific practices. Likewise, while my analysis is specific to individual neuroimaging 
experiments, it contributes to a broader collection of descriptive studies. As a collection, these 
highlight the philosophical importance of studying the diverse uses of scientific concepts in 
experiments more generally. However, given my aim of extension, I will not consider implications 
for more general accounts of scientific concepts at this time. Likewise, engaging in debates around 
the normative implications of accounts such as this are beyond the present scope.3 Instead, to 
illustrate how localised descriptive accounts can contribute to broader normative questions, I will 
briefly outline how my account might converge with concerns expressed about the appropriate 
uses of concepts in neuroscientific practices.  
My approach to studying concepts builds upon diverse accounts of conceptual practices that 
intersect via their descriptions of experimentally generated knowledge (Smith 2018a; 2019). As part 
of this, I adopt several views that extend our understanding of concepts beyond the more familiar 
questions of meaning and reference. Two of these are worth emphasising at the outset. First, 
concepts can function as more than simply mental or linguistic representational vessels for 
knowledge (Kindi 2012; MacLeod 2012; Nersessian 2012). In addition, concepts can be used 
productively regardless of whether there is ongoing disagreement about their referential stability 
(Bloch 2012b; Bloch-Mullins 2020; McCaffrey and Machery 2012). Viewed in these ways, concepts 
have been shown to contribute to the generation of knowledge in a variety of ways: concepts can 
mediate the interplay between theoretical and experimental practices (Bloch 2012a; Feest 2012); 
concepts can be theoretically polyvalent and still contribute to experimental practices (Arabatzis 
and Nersessian 2015; Schmidgen 2014); and concepts interact within the unpredictably emergent 
                                                      
3 As I discuss in Smith (2018a) section 1.1., my approach is positioned within a broader understanding of scientific 
knowledge as simultaneously contributing to robust accounts of real phenomena and contingent upon the situated 
practices within which individual knowledge-claims emerge. As such, it converges with those accounts of scientific 
concepts that support normative commitments requiring engagement in the situated contexts of scientific practices. 
For example, see Bloch-Mullins (2020) p.24. for a discussion of pluralistic realist views of concepts that do not assume 
natural kinds can be read off the world.  
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dynamics between human, material, and conceptual elements of investigative practices (Chang 
2014; Pickering 2006).  
These diverse accounts on the uses of scientific concepts each offer important insights. In 
addition, I found consistent themes to build upon in my comparative analysis of the concepts of 
mental imagery and hallucinations. In this, I developed a view of concepts as accrued bodies of 
shared knowledge that helped me to examine their uses as tools for individuating instances of a 
type of phenomena for pursuing specific goals within a given area of investigative practice (Smith 
2018a). Trained in integrated approaches to historical and philosophical studies of scientific 
practices, I began by considering how the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations each came 
to be used independently of each other in neuroimaging experiments (Smith 2018b). This historical 
context helped, in turn, to explain how equivalent findings about the neuroanatomical correlates of 
SLMP can be reported from experiment that nonetheless generate first-order knowledge claims 
that diverge depending on whether these SLMP were conceptualised as mental imagery or 
hallucinations  (Smith 2018a). In this paper, I provide a more detailed exploration of a specific 
tension that is evident, yet not adequately examined, in these earlier accounts.  
This tension emerges between the history of unresolved attempts to reliably differentiate 
discrete forms of SLMP, and contemporary uses of mental imagery and hallucinations as if each 
reliably refers to a discrete form of SLMP. For example, the concepts of mental imagery and 
hallucinations are each used independently of the other in neuroimaging experiments; uses that 
take for granted the reliability of each concept for individuating instances of SLMP specifically 
relevant to their divergent goals. This tension draws attention to the interdependent sets of 
characteristics that uses of these concepts simultaneously rely upon and obscure. On the one hand, 
when used to individuate SLMP of interest, these characteristics reinforce entrenched mediator-
view associations about the distinction between functional and dysfunctional SLMP. At the same 
time, each set of characteristics can be applied flexibly to obscure the continued reliance on the 
mediator-view associations thought to have been discarded. By appreciating these dynamics, this 
tension can be understood in relation to the goal-directed uses of each concept: investigating the 
role of SMLP in normal cognitive function or cognitive dysfunction, respectively.  
As this paper builds on existing accounts of conceptual practice, I begin by outlining the key 
descriptions of scientific practices supporting my examination of concepts as goal-directed tools. 
Having reprised my analytic approach, Section 2 describes contemporary uses of two concepts as 
goal-directed tools for investigating SLMP in individual neuroimaging experiments. As part of this, I 
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outline the inverse characterisation of the forms of SLMP conceptualised as mental imagery and 
hallucinations. These inverse characterisations highlight friction between two aspects of conceptual 
practice: uses of mental imagery and hallucinations as stable concepts for individuating experiences 
of SLMP for further investigation; and unresolved questions about the referential stability of any 
specific conceptualisation of SLMP. While not necessarily problematic itself, this friction draws 
attention to an unresolved point of tension between the past and present conceptualisations of 
SLMP. Therefore, Section 3 revisits some of the historical conditions within which inverse 
characteristics emerged to help individuate instances of those SLMP conceptualised as mental 
imagery and hallucinations.4 Leaving aside the details, I focus on re-examining how these 
characterisations reflect the mediator-view associations I previously identified as connecting these 
two concepts (Smith 2018b). I will then sketch two additional historical developments: unresolved 
disputes over how to characterise discrete forms of SLMP; and uses of the concepts of mental 
imagery and hallucinations that explicitly discarded the mediator-view of SLMP. 
In Section 4, I examine this tension with a more nuanced appreciation of the ongoing 
relevance of the mediator-view of SLMP. As part of this, I describe how entrenched mediator-view 
associations provide a limited yet flexible array of possible sequences for the complementary 
inferential components of each concept when used in individual experiments with distinct goals. 
Extending my earlier account, I propose that examining the inferential role of a concept can help 
reveal how entrenched associations structure the uses of that concept for specific goals. In doing 
so, I seek to illustrate how examining unresolved tensions can help highlight that entrenched 
associations can remain both integral to, and obscured by, the uses of concepts as goal-directed 
tools within experimental practices. 
1 Descriptive Accounts of Concepts as Goal-Directed Tools 
This paper draws upon, and extends, my earlier account of how entrenched associations help 
structure the uses of hallucinations and mental imagery concepts as goal-directed tools within 
neuroimaging research practices (Smith 2018a; 2018b). This earlier account built upon a wide range 
of existing literature on the dynamics of conceptual practices. Therefore, while detailed elsewhere, 
key insights from this area of scholarship are worth reiterating. Firstly, I am drawing on Uljana 
                                                      
4  It is important to note that, in focusing on one connection, I am obscuring the rich tapestries of sociological and 
technological contexts required to understand the broader historical developments that gave rise to each concept. 
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Feest’s (2010) description of concepts as tools that can be used for individuating instances of a 
given type of phenomena for further investigation. In this context, to individuate something is to 
single it out by distinguishing it from other phenomena of the same (broader) kind. For example, 
Feest (2010, 173) describes scientific concepts as individuating a type of phenomena for further 
investigation by delineating instances of that phenomenon from other classes of phenomena within 
an available body of knowledge. Likewise, in examining the characterisation of different forms of 
SLMP, I follow Corinne Bloch (2012a, 215), who highlights how the process of individuation involves 
articulating the characteristics that delineate the phenomena of interest from potentially related 
types of phenomena. 
This process of individuation is able to be based on the reference, inferential role, or 
epistemic goal of a concept – or any combinations thereof (Bloch-Mullins 2020, 10). This view 
builds on Ingo Brigandt’s (2002, 4) proposal that concepts need to be analysed in terms of three 
distinct components of semantic content: a reference (the kinds of entities, properties, or 
processes a concept refers to); an inferential role (connecting beliefs about how a concept can be 
used to support the inferences and explanations between the concept and other concepts within a 
given language community); and an epistemic goal (the standards that set what a concept can be 
used for within a given investigative context). In addition to helping account for conceptual change, 
articulating these components of concepts aids our understanding of contemporary conceptual 
practices. As Brigandt (2012, 78) details, the inferences made possible by a concept embody the 
conceptual relationships supporting the use of that concept to investigate and explain the target 
phenomena of interest. In addition, the epistemic goal of a concept functions as the standards by 
which any changes to the referential and/or inferential components of a concept are deemed 
epistemically warranted in a given context (Brigandt 2010, 24).  
To understand how concepts are used, the inferential role of a concept should therefore be 
considered relative to the context-specific epistemic goals the concept is used for. This distinction 
highlights the potential variance in the relationships between debates about the referential stability 
of a concept, the inferences and explanations supported by a concept as used in practice, and the 
epistemic goals that set the standards for what can be investigated by using these concepts in 
different contexts. As detailed later, tensions between these aspects of conceptual practice can 
contribute to our understanding of how concepts can function as stable tools within experimental 
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practices even while debates over referential reliability remain unresolved within the broader 
discourse.5  
In addition to these specific insights, I also draw on several broader areas of existing research: 
studies on how scientific concepts can be used as tools that enable scientific practices (Bloch 2012a; 
Boon 2015; Feest 2010; 2012); studies of the historically situated epistemic goals that certain 
scientific concepts were appropriate for pursuing (Brigandt 2012; Steinle 2012; MacLeod 2012); 
accounts of the structured associations between concepts (Andersen 2009; 2012); and studies 
highlighting how associations accrue as sediment that can structure the uses of concepts during the 
dynamics of investigative practices (Chang 2014; Pickering 1995; Steinle 2010). In previous 
approaches to building on these areas of scholarship, I developed an account how the concepts of 
mental imagery and hallucinations are structured for use as tools in investigative practices with 
specific epistemic goals (Smith 2018a). As part of this approach, I examined the past and present 
uses of the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations. In doing so, I found that the current 
independent uses of these two concepts sit in tension with the longer history of unresolved 
disputes over how to reliably differentiate between discrete forms of SLMP within the broader 
literature. 
Now, to re-examine this tension, I draw on existing accounts of conceptual practice and their 
integration into my own approach. In addition, I seek to draw on the specific insights outlined here 
to extend my earlier approach by exploring how entrenched associations structure the space of 
inferential possibilities within which a concept can be used even when the referential component 
remains in doubt.  As outlined earlier, this extension will be detailed in Section 4. First, it is 
important to appreciate the uses of the concepts of hallucinations and mental imagery as goal-
directed tools in contemporary experiments (Section 2), and revisit some of the historical context 
for these practices (Section 3). 
2 Using the Concepts of Hallucination and Mental Imagery as Independent Tools 
Experiences of SLMP correlate with changes in neural activity localised to specific brain regions, 
with many of these correlations being reported regardless of whether an experiment investigated 
                                                      
5 Note that, while used as stable tools in individual experiments, there are longer-term processes of epistemic iteration 
through which different components of the concepts of hallucinations and mental imagery each changed piecemeal – a 
process through which each has been modified by their contributions to investigative practices, as I have detailed 
previously (Smith 2018a). 
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experiences of mental imagery or hallucinations. Given this, findings from contemporary 
neuroimaging experiments often support knowledge-claims that implicate the same brain-regions 
in experiences of both mental imagery and hallucinations (Smith 2018a).6 This overlap is not 
surprising in and of itself. The usual explanation is that these overlaps are due to similarities in low-
level sensory processing common to both mental imagery and hallucinations; typically some, as-yet 
unidentified, top-down regulatory mechanism is then proposed to explain the expected distinction 
between mental imagery and hallucinations (Allen et al. 2008; Hill and Linden 2013). However, in 
examining a decade of published neuroimaging experiments that used the concepts of either 
mental imagery or hallucinations, I found that brain regions implicated in both types of SLMP were 
never recognised as such at the time (Smith 2018a). Instead, even when reporting findings about 
regions previously implicated in multiple types of SLMP, the findings were taken to support 
diverging knowledge-claims about the unique mechanisms underlying either the functions of 
mental imagery, or a specific dysfunction responsible for hallucinations.7 
Two fMRI experiments offer an example of how an equivalent finding can support diverging 
knowledge-claims: one claim in an investigation using the concept of mental imagery and another 
claim in an investigation using the concept of hallucinations. When published, each experiment 
reported an equivalent finding in terms of SLMP: that an increase in superior temporal gyrus (STG) 
activity occurs during auditory SLMP experiences (compared to non-SLMP experiences). However, 
in reporting these findings, neither article acknowledged the potential that the correlation between 
SLMP and the change in STG activity might be relevant to low-level sensory processes shared by 
both mental imagery and hallucinations in the auditory modality. Instead, in the mental imagery 
experiment, the finding contributed to a claim that functional mechanisms of auditory imagery are 
distinct from the mechanisms underlying imagery in other sensory modalities. Meanwhile, in the 
hallucinations experiment, the finding contributed to the claim that auditory hallucinations are due 
to dysfunctions in processing auditory perception. In each article, additional data contributed to 
                                                      
6 While there are various types of knowledge-claims, here I am exclusively referring to first-order knowledge claims – 
those ‘unit contributions… of scientific development’ that, if incorporated into the structure of the relevant scientific 
discipline, can become accepted as scientific facts – see Leydesdorff (1991) p.75. 
7 Note that ‘mechanism’ here can be understood as the causal account of how neurocognitive processes might explain 
the mental phenomena under investigation. There are other uses of the concept of ‘mechanism’ in biology, see 
Nicholson (2012). There are also a range of philosophical questions raised by the role of mechanistic-approaches to 
investigative practices – for examples, see Colaço et al. (2015) and Machamer et al. (2000). 
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these contrasting knowledge-claims. Even so, after examining many such examples this was the 
pattern that emerged – equivalent findings supported diverging knowledge-claims (Smith 2018a).  
Examining this pattern in more detail, I found that the uses of each concept carried a range of 
assumptions and expectations that played crucial roles throughout the design and implementation 
of individual experiments (Smith 2018a). In examining the contributions of these concepts to the 
documented experimental practices, I drew on several accounts of conceptual practice. In doing so, 
I described how these concepts function as tools for individuating discrete types of SLMP for further 
investigation; a function that contributes to the ways that data is generated in alignment with 
different epistemic goals. Firstly, experiments investigating mental imagery contributed to the 
broader goal of understanding the role of ordinary experiences of SLMP in neurocognition. 
Meanwhile, the concept of hallucinations was always used with the goal of investigating SLMP as 
dysfunctional neurocognitive processes; with a range of ordinary functions put forwards as 
candidates for this disruption.  
While differing goals may reflect contextual factors, this alignment persisted across 
disciplinary divides, publication contexts, differing theoretical commitments, and various technical 
considerations. This suggests that, while these two goals were typically pursued independently of 
each other, the entrenched associations carried-along by each concept cut across the semi-
permeable disciplinary boundaries within the broader investigative context of the wide range of 
neuroscientific researchers using fMRI techniques to investigate SLMP. Taking these variables into 
account, examining the epistemic goals associated with each concept provides a way to study the 
uses of that concept within a given investigative context; rather than simply explaining the role of 
the concept when tied to the theoretical dynamics within a given discipline.  
To highlight the value of recognising the uses of concepts within specific investigative 
contexts, I want to draw attention to the typical characteristics associated with each concept. As 
outlined in Table 1, mental imagery SLMP are typically characterised as what SLMP conceptualised 
as hallucinations are not, and vice-versa. Mental imagery conceptualises those SLMP characterised 
as being deliberate experiences, located ‘inside the head’, with a degree of vividness that 
sufficiently resembles perception without being confused for it. Hallucinations, in contrast, are 
characterised as those spontaneous and abnormally-vivid SLMP, experienced as persistent and 
external (originating within perceptual space), that tend to be attributed to a non-self-source.  
As highlighted by Table 2 and Table 3, the inverse sets of characteristics attributed to those 
SLMP conceptualised as either mental imagery or hallucinations have proven unreliable at 
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differentiating between ordinary and pathological forms of SLMP (Smith 2018a). Despite these 
challenges, the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations continue to be used, independently 
of each other, to investigate ordinary and pathological SLMP respectively (Smith 2018a). This leads 
to friction when these different aspects of conceptual practice intersect. However, rather than 
critique this current friction, I instead seek to examine the longer-term tension it draws attention 
to. This tension is best understood by contextualising current uses of mental imagery and 
hallucinations as stable concepts by positioning them in relation to historical failures to establish 
the referential stability of any specific conceptualisation of SLMP. Therefore, in the next section, I 
revisit some of the historical conditions within which the inverse characterisations of mental 
imagery and hallucinations emerged. 
3 A Past of Interdependent Conceptual Associations 
There are many accounts of the historical development of the concept of mental imagery (Bower 
1984; Cocking 1991; MacKisack et al. 2016; Roeckelein 2004; Waller et al. 2012). The concept of 
hallucinations has also received considerable attention (Aleman and Larøi 2008; Berrios and 
Marková 2012; Peyroux and Franck 2013; Sarbin and Juhasz 1967). When examined together, these 
histories can be seen to intersect in ways that remain relevant to the current uses of each concept – 
including the influence of the ‘mediator-view’ of SLMP (Smith 2018b). 
This mediator-view also has a long history that pre-dates these two concepts: attempts to 
differentiate discrete types of SLMP within classical Greek works drew on mediator expectations of 
SLMP; similar accounts of SLMP can be found within a range of Arabic and Christian philosophies; 
while empiricist philosophical traditions of the nineteenth century present the mediator-view in its 
most recognisable form (Smith 2018a). As outlined above, this mediator-view positions SLMP as a 
midpoint between perception and abstract thought. This view of SLMP rests upon a series of 
associations about the ability of a reasonable person to make accurate judgements about, and 
regulate, bodily sensations. According to this series of associations, experiences of SLMP that are 
more persistent or vivid are assumed to be more difficult to control. In addition, characteristic types 
such as location, insight, and attribution, all position pathological SLMP as the result of an 
individual’s inability to recognise their ordinary SLMP as such and/or their failure to appropriately 
regulate these sensory experiences. Given this series of associations, ordinary and abnormal SLMP 
can be differentiated by the presence or absence of various typical characteristics (Table 1).  
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It was these mediator-view associations that provided the dominant body of knowledge 
about SLMP seen within early scientific investigations using the concepts of mental imagery or 
hallucinations (Smith 2018b). In the case of mental imagery, some early studies documented 
individual variability in SLMP descriptions – including a sizeable minority not reporting imagery 
experiences at all (Betts 1909). Despite this variability, memory and imagination were nonetheless 
considered to require SLMP (Bower 1984; Roeckelein 2004; Faw 2009). This approach reflected the 
established characterisations of valued forms of SLMP within the dominant philosophical and 
religious traditions of the time. For example, the resemblance to perception of vivid imagery was 
proposed to underlie memory, while the manipulable and dismissible control over such imagery 
was taken to explain how imagination could adequately serve abstract thought. Meanwhile, 
following Jean-Etienne Esquirol’s proposal of hallucinations as a concept for over-excited memories 
and imaginations in the late 1800s, undesirable SLMP were increasingly investigated in relation to 
failures in judgement during cerebral over-excitation (rather than as false perceptions or damage to 
the senses) (Esquirol 1845). As this approach developed, these inverse sets of characteristics 
provided a justification for conceptualising those SLMP found in clinical contexts as dysfunctional 
mental imagery. In short, the inverse characteristics provided proxy criteria for explaining how a 
required element of thought could come to threaten our ability to judge the validity of our 
perceptions in socially acceptable ways. 
Although continuing within some philosophical traditions, the mediator-view of SLMP was 
effectively abandoned by scientists using the concepts of mental imagery or hallucinations during 
the 20th century (Smith 2018b). On the one hand, scientific uses of the concept of hallucinations 
shifted away from investigating abnormal SLMP as dysfunctional forms of mental imagery. Instead, 
investigations shifted towards exploring whether SLMP are caused by disruptions of a range of 
other ‘normal’ functions – sensory-processing, language pathways, executive-functions, and so 
forth. Along the way, the concept of hallucinations was increasingly used without any reference to 
that of mental imagery at all. 
Meanwhile, scientific uses of the concept of mental imagery that had started out framed by 
their necessary role in thought were later demoted, with mental imagery even being dismissed as 
an unnecessary or childish pastime during the imageless-thought debates that culminated in the 
12 
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1930s.8 Along the way, the mediating position between perception and abstract thought was subtly 
replaced, with behavioural responses emerging in roles previously given to mental imagery. For 
example, investigations of mental experiences – and terms such as mental states, mind, and 
imagery – were all discarded in favour of analyses of behavioural stimulus and response as habit 
formation (Watson 1994, 250).  
When eventually revived for use as a scientific concept within cognitive psychology, mental 
imagery came to be regarded as merely one of the many forms in which sensory-data can be 
represented in thought (Smith 2018b). During this revival, the concept of mental imagery was 
primarily used to investigate ordinary SLMP. For example, investigations on the role of imagery in 
cognition often focused exclusively on visual imagery. This contributed to distancing the SLMP of 
interest from those SLMP conceptualised as hallucinations (which were primarily being used to 
investigate the pathologies of SLMP in the auditory modality at that time).9 
In this way, inverse characterisations of these two concepts continued to help individuate the 
specific SLMP of interest and there was little appetite for reviewing their reliability. These 
characteristics therefore remained part of the inferential component of each concept even as the 
mediator-view was dismissed as irrelevant to the independent investigations into functional and 
dysfunctional SLMP, respectively. In addition, the inherited assumptions justifying these inverse 
sets of characteristics became entrenched, with the relevant set of characteristics implicitly 
providing key phenomenological descriptions when defining each concept (Smith 2018a). 
As each concept stabilised for use in investigations that were independent of the other, 
additional attempts to characterise the boundaries of the SLMP-of-interest generated a range of 
proposals for in-between conceptualisations of SLMP (Table 2). Drawing on Hanne Andersen 
(2012), each of these proposals can be understood as a ‘graded’ SLMP concept: a conceptualisation 
of anomalous SLMP that combines features of both mental imagery and hallucination while 
nonetheless remaining distinct from both of these more established concepts.10 For example, in 
                                                      
8 For a more detail, see Smith (2018a). Also note the borader interconnected factors contributing to this ‘fallow’ period 
of research on mental imagery: rejections of introspective techniques as subjective; behaviourism in psychology; a ‘turn 
to language’ within analytic philosophy; and increased scepticism of quasi-perceptual experiences in philosophical 
phenomenology. Also see: Holt (1964) pp.259-259; Kind (2001) pp.85-86; and Pearson (2014) pp. 178-179.  
9 Given this, I was sensitive to SLMP modality during comparative analyses in Smith (2018a) and it should note that, 
despite some interest in modality-specific mechanisms, expectation of modality-independent mechanisms persist with 
claims about one modality were sometimes generalised to all modalities.  
10 Hanne Andersen (2012) describes how ‘graded structures’ are used by different members of the scientific community 
to explain why anomalies in the ‘no-overlap rule’ do not challenge a given conceptual structure. I detailed how the 
notion of ‘graded concepts’ fits within my account in Smith (2018a). 
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attempts to clarify the disputed definitions of ‘true’ pathological hallucinations during the 
twentieth-century, competing proposals for ‘pseudohallucinations’ were introduced (Walker 2013). 
One such proposal, by Kurt Jaspers, clumped together all those SLMP experienced as abnormally 
vivid (like hallucinations) even if those SLMP were located ‘inside the head’ (like mental imagery) 
(Peyroux and Franck 2013; Taylor 1981). Another proposal, by Alvin Goldstein, tried to account for 
those subjects who retained insight (about the unreality of SLMP) despite these phenomena 
otherwise having all the characteristics of ‘true’ hallucinations (Walker 2013). Meanwhile, there 
were reports of abnormally vivid visual SLMP experienced as projected into perceptual space 
despite being voluntary, controlled, and recognised as distinct from actual perceptual stimuli (Gray 
and Gummerman 1975). Treated as a childish oddity, this type of phenomena came to be referred 
to as ‘eidetic imagery’ – a new conceptualisation of SLMP considered distinct from ordinary mental 
imagery.  
As these examples suggest, the typical characteristics relied upon to distinguish between 
mental imagery and hallucinations (and other conceptualisations of SLMP) are neither sufficient nor 
necessary for distinguishing between desirable and undesirable SLMP (Smith 2018a, sec. 3.3). 
Despite this, mental imagery and hallucinations continue to be used for investigating discrete types 
of SLMP. Meanwhile, additional graded-concepts continue to be proposed for those SLMP that fail 
to fit into the dominant binary provided by the concepts of (benign) mental imagery and 
(pathological) hallucinations (Table 3). These attempts echo earlier overlapping descriptions of 
proposed in-between forms of SLMP such as pseudohallucinations and eidetic imagery. For 
example, there have been various attempts to differentiate the non-pathological (benign) 
hallucinations reported within ‘normal’ populations from those hallucinations diagnosed in clinical 
contexts (e.g., Copolov, Mackinnon, and Trauer 2004; Faccio et al. 2013).11 Likewise, there are 
ongoing attempts to distinguish between ordinary (benign) mental imagery and various intrusive or 
otherwise unwanted imagery identified as distressing within clinical populations (e.g., Beaman and 
Williams 2010; Brewin et al. 2010). In each case, the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations 
tend to be used independently of each other; with the graded-concepts providing a buffer-zone for 
containing the threat presented by the wide range of SLMP that fail to align with typical distinctions 
between the ordinariness of mental imagery and the abnormality of hallucinations (Smith 2018a, 
sec. 3.3). 
                                                      
11 For an example of the earlier studies these echo, see Parish (1902). 
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While it made sense to characterise the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations as the 
inverse of each other when positioned within the mediator-view of SLMP, these characterisations 
are unreliable for differentiating between ordinarily benign and distressingly clinically-relevant 
SLMP in practice. Despite this, the inverse characterisations of the concepts of mental imagery and 
hallucinations persist in the practices of individuating instances of ordinary or abnormal forms of 
SLMP for the goal of investigating either functional or dysfunctional neurocognitive processes.  
The unresolved ambiguities in the relationship between the concepts of mental imagery and 
hallucinations are obscured by these graded-concepts. With the interdependent relationship 
obscured, the mediating-role associations about SLMP continues to contribute to the structure 
within which the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations are routinely used, independently 
of each other, as goal directed tools in neuroimaging experiments (Smith 2018b). Structured in this 
way, the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations can be simultaneously delineated in 
relation to each other and used independently of each other.  
4 Independent Uses Structured by Interdependent Associations  
Recent attempts to conceptualise experiences of SLMP that resist the characterisations of both 
mental imagery and hallucinations, such as intrusive-imagery and non-pathological hallucinations, 
highlight unresolved questions about distinguishing between benign and distressing experiences of 
SLMP. Viewed in this way, graded-concepts highlight areas of potential evolution in the referential 
targets for the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations. For example, a range of approaches 
have investigated the possibility that the distress of hallucinations may be caused by the co-
presence of SLMP with another factor, such as childhood trauma, rather than the SLMP itself (e.g., 
Andrew, Gray, and Snowden 2008; Longden, Madill, and Waterman 2012). Likewise, while 
extending the concept of mental imagery to include intrusive and uncontrolled SLMP, these are 
similarly considered in terms of biopsychosocial contexts rather than as necessarily pathological in 
and of themselves (e.g., Brewin et al. 2010; Speckens et al. 2007). When these overlapping 
accounts of individual variability and the context-dependence of ordinary and distressing 
experiences of SLMP are positioned side-by-side they prompt questions about the referential 
stability of the concepts of both hallucinations and mental imagery (Table 2 and Table 3).  
However, whether or not researchers were aware of these unresolved debates in this broader 
context, questions about the referential stability of the concepts of mental imagery and 
hallucinations did not penetrate the published accounts of any of the individual experiments I 
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examined (Smith 2018a). Instead, the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations were used 
independently of each other to pursue divergent goals: understanding the role of ordinary 
experiences of SLMP in neurocognition or investigating SLMP as dysfunctional neurocognitive 
processes, respectively. These goals treat the target SLMP of each concept as reliably individuated 
from other forms of SLMP. While this practice may not require stable referents, it relies on the 
phenomena of interest being distinct enough to warrant independent investigation. Each concept is 
used as if reliably individuating a discrete form of SLMP relevant for different epistemic goals.  
Used in this the, these two goals provide the set of standards by which any changes to the 
referential and/or inferential components of each concept is deemed epistemically warranted 
(Brigandt 2010, 24). For example, assumptions about referential stability can be seen in the use of 
each concept as a stable tool in neuroimaging experiments that rely upon routine practices for 
individuating the phenomena of interest. These routines include disciplined associations that align 
the experimental aims, methods, and results with the specific goal embodied by each concept 
(Smith 2018a). During this alignment, the referential component of each concept is treated as 
stable – the concept of hallucinations is used as if reliably individuating distinctly pathological 
SLMP, while the concept of mental imagery is used as if necessarily referring only to the distinctly 
benign SLMP that all healthy people are expected to experience. In each case, the concept 
functions in relation to the standard of reference provided by the goal of investigating functional or 
dysfunctional SLMP, respectively. For instance, the difficulty of distinguishing between those SLMP 
experienced as functional or dysfunctional SLMP is not considered relevant when responding to 
unexpected outcomes within a given experiment. Instead, the responses that emerge reflect the 
limited yet flexible array of possible conceptual sequences provided by the shared set of 
associations each concept inherits from the mediator-view of SLMP  (Smith 2018a).   
Given the standards set by the epistemic goals, the inferential component of each concept 
can be understood as providing the constrained possibilities available for response to the emergent 
interactions within experimental practice. As detailed earlier, the inferential components of these 
two concepts share an entrenched set of associations inherited from the mediator-view of SLMP. 
That the constraints and opportunities that the entrenched set of mediator-view associations 
provide contributions to the inferential components of each concept can be illustrated with some 
examples. Firstly, in one experiment, an unexpectedly high level of neural activity was found within 
language-related regions while the subject was supposed to be experiencing visual mental imagery 
(Kana et al. 2006). This unexpected finding was explained away by relying on the sedimented 
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association that mental imagery is effortful and, as such, verbal memory might be required to 
generate mental imagery from language cues.12 In another experiment, an unexpected mismatch 
was reported between the timing of acute hallucinatory experiences and the timing of changes in 
neural activity (van de Ven et al. 2005). This difference in timing was dismissed as inconsequential 
by inferring, in line with the entrenched mediator-view associations, that people who hallucinate 
cannot be relied upon to accurately report their experiences. In each case, there was no published 
consideration of the possibility that these unexpected results might indicate something of interest 
about either the type of phenomena investigated, and/or the measurement tools involved. Instead, 
the disciplined performances of using each concept were structured by routine associations 
appropriate for the goal each concept was used to pursue.13  
These routine associations reflect how the mediator-view of SLMP provides the body of 
knowledge within which inverse characterisations of mental imagery and hallucinations contribute 
to the space of possible inferences supported by each concept.14 Integral to this implicit set of 
associations is the justification provided by the mediator-view of SLMP for why some SLMP can be 
regarded as ordinary while other SLMP should be treated as pathological. That is, while the 
philosophical context for the mediator-view of SLMP was rejected in the twentieth-century, 
nineteenth-century assumptions inherited via these distinguishing characteristics continue to 
inadvertently contribute to the design and implementation of the methodological procedures 
reported for the fMRI experimental investigations investigating either mental imagery or 
hallucinations.  
These contrasting assumptions, and the fixed yet flexible array of possible conceptual 
sequences they reflect, can also be found in the way that each of the concepts used for 
investigating SLMP sets the standard for the experimental tasks intended to isolate an aspect of the 
SLMP of interest – a standard that directs research towards the relevant goal associated with that 
concept. Two types of experimental tasks help illustrate this point: tasks requiring subjects to make 
an external-judgement (about perceptions) and tasks requiring subjects to make an internal-
                                                      
12 See Steinle’s (2010) adaptation of Husserl’s notion of sedimentation for describing how concepts that emerged in a 
specific context can later came to appear as solidified and stable ‘natural’ categories (if not as facts). 
13 See Pickering (1995; 2006) for more on how ‘machine-like’ human performances can become disciplined routines 
that structure conceptual associations in ways that become institutionalised – carried along by collective actions in 
ways that persist regardless of human intention. 
14 Note that, rather than a theory attempting to explain these phenomena, the mediator-view of SLMP can be 
understood as a set of entrenched associations that subtly contribute to the investigation of SLMP across multiple 
conflicting theoretical and experimental contexts. For more detail, see Smith (2018a). 
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judgement (about remembered or imagined perceptual experiences). Both types of tasks were 
used in experiments investigating SLMP regardless of whether these mental phenomena were 
conceptualised as mental imagery or hallucinations.15 However, the specific expectations about 
how these tasks helped to individuate the phenomena of interest aligned with different goals 
depending on the conceptualisation of SLMP used (Smith 2018a). Firstly, when investigating mental 
imagery, the external-judgement experimental tasks were expected to identify the role of mental 
imagery in either emotional judgement during perceptual processing or language comprehension. 
For example, in the experimental task described by Kana et al. (2006, 2487), subjects were 
presented with sentences on a computer screen and asked to judge whether each sentence 
presented was true or false. The sentences were simple statements: such as, “Oranges, pineapples 
and coconuts are all triangular in shape” and “Addition, subtraction, and multiplication are all math 
skills” (Kana et al. 2006, 2486–87). 
Two conditions were used to analyse how these sentence-comprehension tasks correlated 
with changes in neural activity: condition one consisted of sentences categorised as high-imagery 
(i.e., those that normal subjects would require imagery to comprehend); the second condition 
consisted of sentences classified as low-imagery (i.e., those that normal subjects would not require 
imagery to comprehend) (Kana et al. 2006, 2487). Of these two example sentences, the first was of 
the high-imagery condition based on the expectation that healthy people would need to visualise 
an orange or a coconut in order to ‘see’ that they are not triangular.16 The other example sentence 
provided a low-imagery condition based on the expectation that healthy people would be able to 
judge the truth of the statement based on semantic information alone.17 In both of these examples 
any actual mental imagery involved in the judgement tasks was inferred from the ability to perform 
the task (rather than requiring confirmation of SLMP experiences during the fMRI scan). This 
example illustrates the continued expectation that mental imagery is a necessary experience during 
tasks thought to mediate between perception and the cognitive functions of language and 
emotional judgement. This expectation is consistent with the mediator-view of SLMP, yet is at odds 
                                                      
15 As task-analysis is a disputed process among neuroimaging practitioners, establishing the technical similarity of these 
tasks is beyond the present scope. Instead, I take the degree of task-similarity in the reported uses (for assessing the 
ability of subjects to make specific kinds of judgements) to illustrate my point. For more detail, see Smith (2018a).  
16 This expectation ignores the possibility of people completing this task by relying purely on semantic information that 
oranges and/or coconuts are not triangular – for example, see Bill Faw (1997). 
17 The expectation aside, being able to judge the truth-value of a sentence without imagery does not mean not also 
experiencing imagery in relation to the sentence (perhaps ‘seeing’ the symbols for each mathematical operation).  
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with the individual variability in documented experiences of mental imagery (Betts 1909; Faw 1997; 
2009; Kozhevnikov and Blazhenkova 2013).  
As a contrasting illustration, in experiments using the concept of hallucinations with 
experimental tasks requiring subjects to make a judgement about perceived stimuli, there was an 
expectation of dysfunction within perceptual processes and/or language comprehension. For 
example, in Escartí et al. (2010, 33) an external-judgement task was intended to “replicate those 
emotions related to hallucinatory experiences” by having subjects listen to aurally presented words 
(pronounced with a tone matching the associated emotion) and later score the level of anxiety each 
word provoked in them. Similarly, in Korsnes et al. (2010, 612), an external-judgement task involved 
asking subjects to listen to specific speech syllables (that were presented differently to each ear) 
while attending to the sound with either their left ear, right ear, or neither. This task, used to help 
investigate hemispheric differences in schizophrenia, reflects an association between the concept 
of hallucinations and the expectation that experiencing these mental phenomena indicates an 
inability to make reliable distinctions between SLMP and actual perceptions. In these cases, 
external-judgement tasks can be seen to reflect an expectation that hallucination indicate a 
pathological tendency to misattribute perceptual stimuli – a view that relies on the implicit 
characterisations of abnormal SLMP during attempts to explaining this confusion in contrast to 
ordinary SLMP.  
A similar pattern emerged for the internal-judgement experimental tasks. Rather than 
investigating ordinary experiences of SLMP, the internal-judgement tasks in experiments 
investigating mental imagery conflated experiences of SLMP with the ability to accurately recall 
perceptual information. Likewise, rather than investigating dysfunctional experience of SLMP 
directly, the internal-judgement task reported in experiments investigating hallucinations conflated 
SLMP with a combination of mental experiences (including delusions) considered to be the ‘positive 
symptoms’ of psychosis. For example, Bien and Sack (2014) expected that ability on an internal-
judgement task reflected the role of mental imagery as a required element of memory, while Wible 
et al. (2009) expected difficulty on an internal-judgement task to be indicative that dysfunctional 
memory and language processing are involved in producing hallucinations.  
Researchers were able to use both external-judgement or internal-judgement tasks in 
experiments investigating mental imagery due to the expectation that carefully regulated SLMP are 
crucial to the ability to make judgements based on remembered/imagined perceptual experiences. 
As the inverse of this, experiments investigating hallucinations routinely include inferences that 
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assume that external-judgement or internal-judgement tasks measure aspects of SLMP in ways that 
align with the goal of investigating the relationship between hallucinations and dysfunction in 
memory and/or language comprehension. Positioned side-by-side, these experimental judgement 
tasks can be seen to rely on the use of each concept as typically characterised – even when these 
characteristics were not explicit. 
The types of assumptions in each of these examples illustrate a pattern consistent across a 
decade of articles documenting neuroimaging experiments using the concepts of either mental 
imagery (to investigate the role of functional SLMP in neurocognition) or hallucinations (to 
investigate the dysfunctional role of SLMP in neurocognition) (Smith 2018a, sec. 7). This pattern is 
the reliance on the inverse characterisation of ordinary and abnormal SLMP within multiple aspects 
of experimental practices using the concepts of either mental imagery or hallucinations. The 
appropriateness of these concepts was never questioned or justified; each concept was used as a 
stable tool that carried routine expectations about neurocognitive processes that would 
(eventually) explain the type of SLMP of interest. 
Drawing on the literature supporting examinations of goal-directed concept-use outlined in 
Section 1, one way to understand the ongoing reliance on these characterisations is by recalling 
how mediator-view associations became routine expectations about the relationship of SLMP to 
reasonable behaviour. Taken for granted in this way, these associations can structure the uses of 
concepts as tools for investigating specific epistemic goals (Smith 2018a). This practice is made 
possible, in part, by the continued reliance on typical characteristics throughout experiments that 
use the concepts of either mental imagery or hallucinations, despite the failure of these 
characteristics to reliably individuate discrete forms of SLMP within the broader literature. 
This practice highlights how mental imagery and hallucinations are used for pursuing discrete 
goals in neuroimaging experiments by relying on the presumed stability of their referential target 
SLMP, and then drawing on a limited yet flexible array of inferential possibilities for explaining the 
role of SLMP in neurocognition. In this way, the goal-directed uses of each concept can persist at 
the level of individual experiments even when questions of reference remain unresolved within the 
broader literature. The tension remains, with entrenched associations carried-along by the 
overlapping inferential components of the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations. This 
suggests that these entrenched associations structure the space of inferential possibilities within 
which these concepts can be used even when their referential component remains in doubt. 
Viewed in this way, the inferential component of these concepts offers another element in our 
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understanding of how the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations are each structured as 
tools for pursuing the diverging goals of explaining SLMP in terms of either functional or 
dysfunctional neurocognitive processes. 
5 Conclusion:  
The tension I have focused on in this paper is the way that mental imagery and hallucinations are 
both used as independently stable concepts despite the unresolved debates over their referential 
reliabilities. The existence of this tension was demonstrated by outlining the friction between the 
broader debates over how to conceptualise discrete forms of SLMP, and the goal-directed uses of 
mental imagery and hallucinations as stable tools within individual experiments. Within this 
broader context, the failure of the typical characteristics to reliably differentiate between discrete 
forms of SLMP is well documented. Nonetheless, the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations 
are each used independently of the other when individuating the SLMP of investigative interest 
within individual experiments. 
In examining the tension these practices reveal, I hope to have demonstrated that there are 
entrenched mediator-view associations that structure the limited yet flexible array of possible 
sequences available for the inferential role of the goal-directed uses of each concept as tools within 
individual experiments. On the one hand, mental imagery is used as a concept for investigating 
those ordinary (benign) SLMP experiences that resemble perception in ways that can aid in various 
neurocognitive functions. On the other hand, hallucinations provide the dominant concept for 
investigating abnormal SLMP that are so (distressingly) like perception that they indicate 
dysfunctional neurocognition. Each concept is used within experiments where the goal is to find a 
unique mechanism to explain how the discrete type of SLMP being investigated contributes to 
functional or dysfunctional neurocognitive processes. That the concepts of mental imagery and 
hallucinations can be used independently of each other in this way is usually taken for granted. 
However, this practice obscures that each concept stabilised as a tool for individuating discrete 
types of SLMP through a series of unsuccessful attempts to characterise the inverse relationship 
between functional and dysfunctional SLMP. As such, the connection between how mental imagery 
and hallucinations each came to be characterised draws attention to the inferential roles and 
epistemic goals involved in investigating functional and dysfunctional SLMP as distinct phenomena. 
As evident in their respective historical developments, both the inferential roles and epistemic 
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goals of the current uses of the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations reflect a shared set 
of deeply entrenched associations about SLMP.  
As outlined in Section 3, this shared set of associations can be traced back to the mediator-
view positioning of ordinary SLMP as mental phenomena for capturing perceptions in the aid of 
abstract thought – phenomena that, if not carefully regulated, can cause confusion over the 
difference between perceptions and thoughts. During the nineteenth-century, this mediator-view 
of SLMP provided the available body of knowledge within which the concept of mental imagery 
began to be used to investigate the role of ordinary SLMP in memory and imagination, as well as for 
the proposed concept of hallucinations as a description of how memories and imaginations could 
become ‘over-excited’ and lead to failures in reason or judgement. In the following debates, inverse 
sets of characteristics considered typical of either functional or dysfunctional SLMP were proposed 
to explain how something required for thought (mental imagery) could lead to failures to correctly 
reason or judge perception (hallucinations). Despite unresolved questions about their reliability, 
these inverse characterisations became routine, carrying-along the interdependent associations 
connecting ordinary and dysfunctional SLMP even after the mediator-view of SLMP itself was 
abandoned during the early twentieth-century. As the examples from contemporary neuroimaging 
practices in Sections 2 and 4 illustrate, these interdependent characterisation of ordinary and 
abnormal SLMP have persisted long after the initial available body of knowledge justifying them 
was abandoned.  
This brings the discussion back to the tension originally identified: the concepts of mental 
imagery and hallucinations are used as independently stable concepts despite debates over the 
referential reliability of each concept remaining unresolved. In exploring this tension further, my 
account of how concepts contribute to investigative practices has acquired additional details. 
Despite a failure to reliably individuate discrete forms of SLMP, the nominally-discarded mediator-
view of SLMP that once justified the inverse characterisations of mental imagery and hallucinations 
remains evident in the ways that these characteristics are implied throughout experiments that use 
the concept of either mental imagery or hallucinations.  
In examining this tension, I have focused on highlighting one of the ways that the inverse 
characterisation of mental imagery and hallucinations sedimented as each concept stabilised 
independently of the other for use as goal-directed tools in neuroimaging experiments (despite 
continued debates elsewhere over how to reliably characterise discrete forms of SLMP more 
generally). In addition, this account could be complemented by considering those questions I put 
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aside earlier about whether the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations are being used 
appropriately in individual experiments. However, to do justice to these normative questions 
several additional areas of literature would need to be explicated – including, discussion of the 
conceptual challenges recognised by neuroscientists (e.g., Poldrack and Yarkoni 2016), views on the 
how individuation of a concept relates to the mechanistic explanation of the phenomena of interest 
(e.g., Craver and Darden 2013), and views on the degree of interdisciplinarity neuroscientific 
practice should support (e.g., Fitzgerald and Callard 2015).  
While such normative considerations are beyond the present scope, it is worth drawing 
attention to some broader implications of descriptions of historically-contingent uses of concepts 
as goal-directed tools in investigative practices. Of particular note is the possible convergence 
between my account – of the entrenched associations that structure the uses of concepts as goal-
directed tools  – and the concerns raised about the conceptual challenges that often go 
unacknowledged in the context of neuroimaging experiments (Abend 2016; Anderson 2015; 
Poldrack and Yarkoni 2016). These challenges include the use of cognitive ontologies that, inherited 
from psychological taxonomies based on behavioural observations, are not being updated in light 
of neuroscientific knowledge (Bunzl, Hanson, and Poldrack 2010, 54; Lenartowicz et al. 2010, 690). 
For example, Russell Poldrack and Tal Yarkoni (2016, 591) express concern about knowledge-claims 
that depend on tacit associations tied to outdated cognitive taxonomies, and call for more explicit 
justification of the concepts used in formal inferences from neuroimaging data. 
One way to identify the tacit conceptual assumptions underlying specific experimental 
inferences is to examine how each concept came to be used as a goal-directed tool within a given 
field of investigation. In the case of mental imagery and hallucinations, this examination identifies a 
shared set of entrenched associations that simultaneously constrain and facilitate the use of each 
concept independently of the other – including providing tacit assumptions that contribute to 
experimental inferences that support different investigative goals. Where possible, explicating tacit 
conceptual and material assumptions can drive further research in areas of epistemic uncertainty 
(Feest 2016). Given this, I take the view that historically informed philosophical engagement with 
(potentially) outdated concepts can enrich our understanding of how these concepts are currently 
used as goal-directed tools in experiments. At the very least, assessments of when a given concept 
should be used would benefit from a range of descriptive accounts detailing the various historically 
situated contexts for the current uses of that concept as a tool for specific goals. 
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To conclude, the independent uses of the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations can 
be seen to simultaneously reflect and obscure a set of shared-associations that each concept 
inherited from the otherwise discarded mediator-views of SLMP. In illustrating this, I draw upon, 
and extend, arguments that there is value in examining how historically-contingent associations can 
structure the current uses of concepts as goal-directed tools in investigative practices. Within this 
narrow scope, I demonstrated that examining tensions in scientific practices can help identify how 
entrenched associations can be both integral to, and obscured by, the goal-directed uses of 
concepts as tools. Finally, while offering a descriptive account, I also hope to have prompted an 
interest in examining the past and present uses of scientific concepts in investigative practices – 
especially when confronted with experiments generating conflicting claims from similar data.  
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Tables  
 
Characteristic 
Type 
Mental Imagery Hallucinations 
Mediator-views of 
Characteristic 
Reported Location Internal External 
Explains why SLMP are (or 
are not)  
able to be judged as 
distinct from perception 
Perceptual 
Similarity 
Vivid 
Fleeting 
Abnormally Vivid 
Concrete 
Volition and 
Control 
Manipulable 
Dismissible 
Obstinate 
Absorbing 
Attribution  Self Other Measures degree that 
SLMP are regulated by 
reason Insight Maintained Lacking 
Table 1: Characterising concepts in the context of mediator-views of SLMP, adapted from Smith (2018a). 
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Typical 
Mental 
Imagery 
Eidetic 
Imagery 
Pseudo- 
hallucinations 
(Jaspers) 
Pseudo- 
hallucinations 
(Goldstein) 
Typical 
Hallucinations 
Location Internal External Internal External External 
Perceptual 
Similarity Low High High High High 
Volition Voluntary Voluntary Involuntary Involuntary Involuntary 
Control Manipulable Manipulable Uncontrolled Uncontrolled Uncontrolled 
Duration Fleeting Persistent Persistent Persistent Persistent 
Attribution Self Self Variable Others Others 
Insight Maintained Maintained Lacking Maintained Lacking 
Subjective 
experience Positive Positive Variable Variable Negative 
Impact Benign Benign Benign Benign Disruptive 
Content Useful Useful not specified not specified Unwanted 
Frequency Variable Frequent Variable Variable Frequent 
Table 2 Additional conceptualisations of SLMP during the early twentieth century - adapted from Smith 
(2018b). 
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  Ordinary  Mental Imagery 
Intrusive  
Mental Imagery 
Non-Pathological 
Hallucinations 
Clinically Relevant 
Hallucinations 
Location Internal Internal Variable Variable 
Perceptual 
Similarity Variable High Variable Variable 
Volition Voluntary Involuntary Involuntary Involuntary 
Control Manipulable Uncontrolled Uncontrolled Uncontrolled 
Duration Fleeting Persistent Fleeting Persistent 
Attribution Self Self Variable Variable 
Insight Maintained Maintained Variable Variable 
Subjective Value Positive Negative Variable Negative 
Impact Benign Disruptive Benign Disruptive 
Content Useful Unwanted Variable Unwanted 
Frequency Variable Frequent Variable Frequent 
Table 3: Emerging conceptualisations of SLMP – adapted from Smith (2018b). 
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